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Abstract. – Ethics has been identified as a
key element in Health Technology Assessment
(HTA) since its conception. However, ethical is-
sues are still not frequently addressed explicitly
in HTA. Several valuable reasons have been
identified.
The basis of the article is the claim that ethics
is often not part of HTA for “epistemological rea-
sons”. Hence, the main aim of the contribution
is to explore in more details and emphasize
them by using the fact/value dichotomy.
Our conclusion is that current HTA configura-
tion is predominantly based on the comparison
among objective and empirically testable
“facts”, whilst ethics is not empirically testable.
In this sense, there is a sort of “epistemological
gap”, which can explain why it is so difficult to
integrate ethics in HTA. We suggest that the
epistemological differences among the various
domains of HTA are addressed more explicitly.
Key Words:
Ethics, Health Technology Assessment, Epistemolo-
gy, Integration.
Introduction
From the conception of Health Technology
Assessment (HTA) in the 1970s, it has been ar-
gued that ethics is a constitutive part of HTA.
Ethics within an HTA aims at analyzing the ethi-
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cal issues raised by the consequences of imple-
menting/not implementing a health technology1-4.
Early, as well as more recent definitions of
HTA include ethics. For instance, in 1985, the
U.S. Institute of Medicine defined HTA as “any
process of examining and reporting properties of
a medical technology used in health care, such as
safety, efficacy, feasibility, and indications for
use, cost, and cost-effectiveness, as well as so-
cial, economic, and ethics consequences, whether
intended or unintended”5.
The European network for Health Technology
Assessment (EUnetHTA) defines HTA as: “a
multidisciplinary process that summarises infor-
mation about the medical, social, economic and
ethical issues related to the use of a health tech-
nology in a systematic, transparent, unbiased, ro-
bust manner. Its aim is to inform the formulation
of safe, effective, health policies that are patient
focused and seek to achieve the best value”6.
Indeed, over the last 40 years, ethics has rarely
been part of HTA work and ethical issues are
still not frequently addressed explicitly in HTA.
Some studies can confirm this argument: a 2000
study by Lehoux and Blume of the 1999 Interna-
tional Society of Technology Assessment in
Health Care CD-ROM database of abstracts pre-
sented at the Annual Meetings (1994-1998) and
all abstracts of papers published in the Interna-
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tional Journal of Technology Assessment in
Health Care (1985-1999) found that from a total
of 2.906 records, only 19 records contained “eth-
ical” in their title (0,7%)7. An analysis of 680
HTA reports produced by six Canadian agencies
between 1997 and 2006 showed that only 17%
addressed ethical issues8. In 2003, the Deutsches
Institut für Medizinische Dokumentation und In-
formation (DIMDI) arrived at similar conclu-
sions analyzing “short assessments on medical
technologies” published worldwide (n = 282):
only 25 reports (9%) described ethical issues9.
A 2007 survey showed that only 5% of 223
HTA reports published between 2003 and 2006
from nine different agencies (five in Canada, two
in the UK, one in Denmark and one in the USA)
considered ethical, social and organizational is-
sues, in addition to clinical and economic evalua-
tions10.
The above trend can be considered as unex-
pected for at least four reasons: (1) Ethics is part
of HTA definitions. (2) HTA has a moral aim (to
improve health and care for people); (3) HTA is
evaluative; (4) Technology is value laden and
confronts us with moral problems which need to
be addressed, supported by a large part of con-
temporary philosophy (Horkheimer, Adorno,
Heidegger, Jonas, Gehlen, Hottois just to men-
tion very few examples). Consequently, it is
quite strange that researchers have not embarked
on this activity, i.e. the ethical assessment of
health technologies, especially as ethical and so-
cial issues are at the core of HTA’s big brother,
Parliamentary Technology Assessment. It is par-
ticularly surprising that Bioethics, whose future
itself is currently debated, seems unable to take
on this task.
Why does it happen so rarely that ethics is in-
tegrated into HTA? At first glance, the reason
seems not to be “methodological”, i.e. related to
“how” this type of investigation is performed.
Over the years, a wide range of approaches have
been suggested to address ethical aspects of
health technologies. A recent systematic review11
has identified 43 conceptual frameworks or prac-
tical guidelines for addressing ethical issues in
HTA, so some authors12,13 have asked whether
there are more methods than applications.
Several reasons why ethics is not a part of
HTA have been identified.
According to ten Have, an ethical analysis is
rarely incorporated in HTA studies for two rea-
sons: technology would often be regarded as a
“value-neutral” tool; at the same time, bioethics
would be dominated by an “engineering” model
of moral reasoning14.
Hofmann has identified ten arguments for why
ethics should be part of HTA13 and has identified
the following list of reasons why ethics may not
be integrated in HTA: “(A) Ethicists are profes-
sional strangers in HTA, i.e., the “goals, meth-
ods, models, and modes of rationality of HTA
and ethics are categorically dissimilar”. (B) A
common agreed methodology for integrating
ethics is lacking. Ethics methodology appears to
be (C) deficient, (D) insufficient, or (E) unsuit-
able. (F) Integrating ethics in HTA is neither ef-
ficient nor needed for successful HTA. (G) Most
moral issues are general, and are not specific to a
given technology. (H) All relevant ethical issues
can be handled within other frameworks, e.g.,
within economics. (I) Ethics can undermine or
burst the foundation of HTA”15.
The reasons discussed by Hofmann are mainly
conceptual, methodological or practical and dis-
cussed from within the HTA perspective. Al-
though epistemic reasons are mentioned, Hof-
mann does not elaborate on this.
Therefore, the hypothesis to be investigated in
this article is that ethics is not a part of HTA for
“epistemological reasons”. Our aim is to explore
them by using the fact/value dichotomy. Before
we do that, we would like to try to explain in
more detail what it means to integrate ethical in-
quiry in HTA.
Hta & Ethics. What Does it Mean to
Integrate Ethics in HTA?
HTA is a multidisciplinary process that sum-
marises information about the short- and the
long-term consequences of implementing/not im-
plementing a health technology. The purpose of
HTA is to support the process of decision-mak-
ing in health care by providing the “best” infor-
mation. In this respect, HTA has been compared
to a “bridge” between the world of research and
the world of decision-making16.
In order to achieve this, HTA is committed to
the activity of collecting and analyzing “evi-
dence” from research in a systematic and repro-
ducible way and to make it accessible and usable
for decision-making purposes by means of “as-
sessment” reports.
“Assessment” is generally defined as the ac-
tion of evaluating relevant aspects of the health
technology to form a basis for decision-making.
It is almost always comparative: the health tech-
nology under review is evaluated against some
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specified standard of performance or other prod-
ucts and treatments. For instance, assessment of
In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (IVF-
ET) safety can be performed by comparing its
safety profile with the safety profile of another
reproductive technology (e.g., with Intra-Cyto-
plasmic Sperm Injection, ICSI).
“Assessment” differs from “appraisal”, which
generally implies some form of recommendation
(prescriptive level) about the implementation/non
implementation of the technology based on the
assessment17. Such a recommendation can lead to
several concrete actions: encouraging, discourag-
ing or even prohibiting implementation, reim-
bursing, funding, disinvesting, etc. Some HTA-
agencies are restricted to assessments of the tech-
nology only and do not make recommendations
about implementation/not implementation in the
healthcare system, while others perform both as-
sessment and appraisal.
What does it mean to perform an ethical as-
sessment? What does it mean exactly to inte-
grate ethics in HTA? What does it mean “to
support” the process of decision-making by pro-
viding the “best information” about the ethical
issues of implementing/not implementing a
health technology?
There are many answers to these questions4.
According to EUnetHTA, the ethical domain
involves “an understanding of the consequences
of implementing or not implementing a health
care technology in two respects: with regard to
the prevailing societal values and with regard to
the norms and values that the technology itself
constructs when it is put into use”18. In addition,
the domain also covers “moral and ethical issues
related to the consequences of performing the
health technology assessment (HTA)”18. The
HTA process itself can, in fact, raise ethical is-
sues2. These are, for example, issues about the
ethical consequences of the choice of endpoints
or of comparators, and whether there are any eth-
ical issues in the economic evaluation2,19.
The ethical analyses in HTA vary according to
the distinction between assessment and appraisal,
e.g., sometimes ethical analyses consist of: (1) a
“simple” list of ethical issues, which have to be
identified, described, and addressed (the most
widely used modality); or, in a more complex
way, (2) moral judgements (e.g., the use of the
technology X is morally good/bad or licit/illicit).
With reference to IVF-ET, it is one thing to
identify, describe, and address ethical issues con-
nected to its implementation (such as risk of ovari-
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an hyperstimulation syndrome in women, embryo
freezing, pre-implantation diagnosis, etc.) and an-
other thing to judge whether its implementation is
morally good/bad or licit/illicit as a whole.
In a certain sense, also the “configuration” of
the approaches for the ethical analysis in HTA
reflect this “dichotomy”: some of them (e.g., the
HTA Core Model18 or the Socratic approach19)
consist of “conceptual frameworks” (which are
often characterized by both a set of questions and
wide literature search), whose aim is to identify
the ethical issues in a clear and efficient manner.
Others are represented by the well-known classic
models of Moral Philosophy (e.g., Deontology,
Utilitarianism, Casuistry, etc.), which are more
useful to make morals judgements.
The Fact/Value Dichotomy
The difference in interpreting ethical analysis
as well as the difficulty in integrating ethics in
HTA can be due to epistemological reasons.
HTA encompasses domains which are “epis-
temologically heterogeneous”: some of them
clearly belong to the natural sciences (e.g.,
safety, effectiveness), others humanistic (e.g.
ethical, socio-cultural and legal domains)20.
The former follow methods from the natural
sciences and are empirically testable; the latter
are dealing with meaning and are not empiri-
cally testable.
For instance, the safety domain is based on
“verifiable facts” (e.g., that ovarian hyperstimu-
lation treatment can cause bleeding is a verifiable
fact) – even though “new facts” could disprove
previously tested facts. On the other hand moral
statements and ethical assessments are not empir-
ically testable (the morality of IVF-ET cannot be
established through observations), although ethi-
cal arguments and assessments may include21-24
empirical premises.
The relationship between sciences and human-
ities or, more specifically, between the natural
sciences and ethics has been one of the most de-
bated topics in modern philosophy and has been
addressed in many ways.
One debate consists of wondering whether it
would be possible “to draw” moral norms from
the knowledge or norms of nature. Another dis-
cussion focuses on studying the relationship be-
tween descriptive propositions (e.g., the moon is
spherical) and normative propositions (e.g.,
killing is despicable). A further debate funda-
mentally considers whether ethics is an authentic
form of knowledge25.
At the centre of much of this debate there has
been a famous passage from the Scottish
philosopher David Hume (1711-1776): “In
every system of morality, which I have hitherto
met with, I have always remarked, that the au-
thor proceeds for some time in the ordinary
ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of
a God, or makes observations concerning hu-
man affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised
to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought,
or an ought not. This change is imperceptible;
but is however, of the last consequence. For as
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new re-
lation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it
should be observed and explained; and at the
same time that a reason should be given, for
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others,
which are entirely different from it. But as au-
thors do not commonly use this precaution, I
shall presume to recommend it to the readers;
and am persuaded, that this small attention
would subvert all the vulgar systems of morali-
ty, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of
objects, nor is perceived by reason”26.
The passage is also known as “Hume’s law”
or “Hume’s guillotine” and has been interpreted
in many ways. In short, it states that you cannot
logically derive an “ought” from an “is”, that is,
you cannot derive “norms” from “facts” – there
is no logical bridge between fact and value.
A similar argument has been defended by the
English philosopher George Edward Moore
(1873-1958). In his Principia ethica, he argued
against any identification of moral properties with
natural properties. In particular, he argued against
what he called the “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics,
by which he meant any attempt to define the word
“good” in terms of some natural quality.
The German sociologist Max Weber (1864-
1920) arrived at similar conclusions too. He
made a strict distinction between “statements of
facts” (describing reality) and “statements of val-
ue” (relating to an ideal). The former were con-
sidered to be objective and the latter subjective.
On this basis, he argued that science, as the
realm of facts, has to be considered strictly sepa-
rated from the realm of values, i.e., ethics, aes-
thetics, and politics.
Despite some differences in terminology, all
the afore mentioned authors made a clear distinc-
tion between facts and values, and repudiated
any attempt to derive moral values from facts.
The same argument has been defended by the
Neo-positivism (also called Logical Positivism
or Logical Empiricism), an important philosophi-
cal movement of the early 1900s, whose radical
fringes ended up arguing even that normative
propositions are meaningless.
20th Century Neo-positivism can be considered
a more up to date version of Positivism of the
19th Century. The new positivists maintained the
radical empiricism from the old movement, the
attention given to the development of the sci-
ences, and the clear aversion to metaphysics.
Its representatives gave a fundamental role to
the logical techniques (which explains the addi-
tion of the adjective logical to Positivism) elabo-
rated by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Al-
fred North Whitehead at the beginning of the 20th
Century. Such techniques had tried to create “ar-
tificial” and “neutral” languages capable of elim-
inating the unavoidable ambiguity present in
everyday language.
The aim of Neo-positivism was to establish a
“scientific philosophy” which as far as possible
would respect the criteria of rigor and exactitude.
It can be interpreted as a program of radical “re-
foundation” of the knowledge of empirical bases,
which would have had to lead to the elaboration
of a “unified language” for the whole science
based on the model of physics.
The assumption on which the whole philo-
sophical conception of Neo-positivism was based
is the well-known “theory of verification,” ac-
cording to which a proposition is “cognitively
meaningful” only if some finite procedure con-
clusively determines its truth. Metaphysics, on-
tology, as well as ethics fail this criterion, and
therefore, they were considered to be cognitively
meaningless. In this way, Neo-positivism cele-
brated a sort of “divorce” of science from ethics.
However, from the 60s both Hume’s law and
Neo-positivism lost appeal.
In this context, the “Philosophical hermeneu-
tics” initiated by Martin Heidegger and devel-
oped by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Truth and
Method came to play a fundamental role. In
essence, Gadamer claimed that understanding is
not fixed but rather changing and indicating new
perspectives, because a certain “prejudice” is al-
ways present. Hence, understanding is always
personal, subjective and never “disinterested”.
This assumption had an impact on the
methodological presuppositions on which mod-
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ern science was based. According to the new
viewpoint, there can be no universal standpoint
from which “objective knowledge” can be
achieved, and all understanding – also scientific
understanding – has to be considered as “contex-
tual” and “historical”.
Another important role has been played by the
German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel (1922-). He
pointed out that moral language analysis always
requires a criterion to distinguish moral language
from any other form of language. This helped to
support the thesis that existence of merely de-
scriptive propositions is an illusion and that it is
impossible to separate normative dimension from
descriptive analysis.
Importantly, the American philosopher Hilary
Putnam (1926-2016) has recently traced the “col-
lapse of the fact/value dichotomy”. According to
him, there is a distinction to be made, useful in
some contexts, between statements of fact and
statements of value, especially of ethical value.
Nevertheless, a strict dichotomy between fact
and value would be indefensible because on the
one side normative (e.g., ethical and aesthetic)
judgments have always a factual basis, and on
the other side scientific judgments encompass
normative elements. As a consequence, science
cannot be considered as “value-free” since “sci-
ence itself presupposes values which are in the
same boat as ethical values with respect to objec-
tivity”27.
These and others reflections have reduced the
significance of the fact/value dichotomy. At the
same time, there has been an increased con-
sciousness that technical-instrumental rationality
cannot be considered as the only form of knowl-
edge. So, the monism of the neopositivistic epis-
temology has entered a crisis, and a sort of “epis-
temological pluralism” has arisen, thus opening
new research perspectives.
There are several “cultural signs” of this epis-
temological change. First of all, the rehabilitation
of the Aristotelian practical philosophy28; sec-
ondly, the studies on the “normative tasks” con-
nected to rationality by Discourse Ethics (partic-
ularly, by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto
Apel)29; thirdly, the birth of some forms of ap-
plied ethics (e.g., clinical ethics, business ethics,
organizational ethics, etc.); finally, the incorpora-
tion of Humanities into medical education. More
generally, we could say that ethics has started to
be considered as a “more integrative part” of the
scientific discourse. This can clearly be seen in
(Parliamentary) Technology Assessment, which
is much more based on the social sciences than
HTA, where the value-ladenness of technology
and “empirical facts” is explicitly addressed.
Discussion
The integration of ethics in HTA can be con-
sidered as part of this trend. From a cultural point
of view, it can be interpreted as an attempt to
overcome the neopositivistic epistemology,
which was only interested in technical and em-
pirically testable issues.
Why it is so difficult to integrate ethics in
HTA seems now be clearer and easier to explain:
ethics meets the same difficulties and “preju-
dices” that it meets whenever it attempts to ac-
cess to the scientific discourse.
To complicate matters, probably HTA owes
much of its success to empirical testing itself.
One of the main strengths of HTA is its great
“ability” to provide empirical evidence in order
to support the decision-making. It is well known
that HTA relies heavily on Evidence-based medi-
cine (EBM), which is a strictly empirical ap-
proach. For instance, safety assessment is gener-
ally performed by means of observation or ex-
perimentation, which allow the acquisition of
“objective information”.
On the contrary, ethics fails to provide this
type of “evidence”, that is, it cannot be empiri-
cally tested. In this sense, the morality of IVF-ET
cannot be established through observations.
However, the fact is that such epistemological
difference is not well highlighted in the defini-
tion of HTA. All the domains appear to be on the
same level. Hence, some – above all people not
expert in ethics – might think that the ethical do-
main is capable of providing “empirical evi-
dence” and that it can be treated like, for exam-
ple, the safety domain. As the operation of pro-
viding this type of evidence fails, then ethical
analyses end up being considered as ineffective,
inconclusive or unnecessary. It’s almost as if all
the old neopositivistic prejudices against any
form of knowledge which cannot be empirically
testable resurface.
To sum up, current HTA configuration is pre-
dominantly based on the comparison among ob-
jective and empirically testable “facts”, whilst
ethics is not empirically testable. Therefore, there
is a sort of “epistemological gap”, which can ex-
plain why it is so difficult to integrate ethics in
HTA.
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Frameworks identifying moral issues with im-
plementing health technologies are directed at
highlighting value issues in order for the legiti-
mate decision makers to make the decisions
about health technologies. Classic methods from
moral philosophy (such as consequentialism, de-
ontology, casuistry, etc.) are more oriented at
providing recommendations. The former, there-
fore, appears to support a fact-generating para-
digm, while the latter appears to support a mean-
ing or decision-generating paradigm. However,
although this appears to underscore the “two cul-
tures” described above, it is, more correctly,
based on the distinction between assessment and
appraisal, described at the outset of this article.
In assessment, decisions about moral issues are
not made by “moral experts,” i.e., ethicists, but
by persons with legitimate decision-making ca-
pacity in the same manner as decisions about the
appropriate level of effectiveness and efficiency
is not made by medical and economic experts.
Conclusions
From an epistemological point of view, the re-
gard for the ethical consequences of implement-
ing/not implementing a health technology can be
considered as part of a more general cultural
process of rehabilitation of ethics into the scien-
tific discourse.
However, although HTA encompasses branch-
es of knowledge which are heterogeneous from
an epistemological standpoint, it owes much of
its success to those forms of knowledge, which
can be empirically testable.
In our opinion, greater emphasis should be
given to the notion both that ethical analysis
“works” on a different level and that its findings
have a different “meaning”. As a result we,
therefore, recommend that the epistemological
differences among the various domains of HTA
are addressed more explicitly.
In this way, perhaps, this sort of “method dis-
pute” (Methodenstreit) for integrating ethics in
HTA will be mitigated and applications – which
represent the “true heart” of the integration –
could be finally enhanced.
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